The United States is moving toward a less regulated banking industry. Banks generally are now allowed to pay market rates of interest on most of their deposits and to sell many of their products nationwide. And banks in some states can now offer a variety of traditionally nonbank financial products, such as brokerage, real estate, and insurance services. More deregulation is on the horizon, too, with the possibility that even the 1933 Glass-Steagall prohibition against banks underwriting corporate securities may be relaxed. Such deregulation, which certainly increases competition among banks as well as between banks and other financial institutions, is viewed by many as benefiting consumers of financial services.
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does not constitute evidence of what would happen in a totally unregulated system. However, if one accepts the proposition that banking is inherently unstable, then U.S. banking history can help assess the effectiveness of alternative regulatory environments in controlling the problem.
One period in U. S. banking history, the so-called Free Banking Era (1837-63), seems a particularly good choice for study. Since this period had relatively few bank regulations (essentially aimed at protecting those who held the currency banks could issue), it allows us to isolate the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of those particular regulations in containing inherent instability. The Free Banking Era, moreover, has the reputation for wildcat banking, frequent bank failures, and substantial losses to users of bank currency despite regulatory attempts to protect them. Thus, the period would seem to have had enough individual bank problems to have easily caused a general loss of confidence in the entire banking system.
Our examination of the evidence indicates, however, that that did not happen during the Free Banking Era. The Concern: Inherent Instability in Banking There is no agreement on a precise definition of inherent instability in banking. However, the conventional view is that it means that general bank panics can occur without economy-wide real shocks, that is, without economywide disturbances to real economic activity that affect all or most banks. The usual explanation for how this can happen involves a local real economic shock that becomes exaggerated by the actions of incompletely informed depositors (or holders of other demand liabilities of banks, for example, free bank notes).
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Incompletely informed depositors are critical to this explanation. According to it, the local real shock causes runs on some banks by causing the value of their assets to fall below the value of their liabilities. Individuals aware of this situation rationally want to withdraw deposits from these banks and switch to currency or deposits of other banks. Since the real shock is local, it does not affect the assets of most banks, so informed depositors do not withdraw funds from them. Thus, if depositors have full information about bank portfolios, no general run or panic results.
Incompletely informed depositors, however, can turn the local shock into a general bank panic. Such depositors cannot always distinguish local shocks from economywide shocks. More important, they cannot clearly distinguish banks that are relatively unaffected by the local shock and still have sufficient assets to cover their deposits (sound banks) from banks that are greatly affected and are left with insufficient assets to cover deposits (unsound banks). Consequently, incompletely informed depositors quite rationally interpret the runs of some banks as a signal that other banks may be in trouble. Hence, the trouble at a few banks spreads as depositors begin to worry about other banks. TTiat is, bank runs are contagious because depositors use the observation of runs of some banks to revise their views about the safety of others. Clearly this general loss of confidence, due to incomplete information, causes more banks to be hurt by the local shock than would be hurt if information were complete. By demanding their funds, a doubting public can force some banks that were not otherwise affected by the local shock to close, to go out of business even though all depositors are eventually paid off. Still more disturbing, a doubting public can cause some sound banks to fail\ to go out of business without being able to fully pay off their depositors. Obviously, the local real shock causes the value of some assets to fall because some banks have to liquidate assets. With complete information, depositors would be able to determine the new level of asset prices, and banks with assets sufficient to cover liabilities would not be run. With incomplete information, however, asset prices can be lower than their full information level because the demands of fearful depositors cause more banks to have to liquidate assets. And at these lower asset prices, fewer banks have assets sufficient to cover liabilities. 3 The Observation: Many Free Bank Failures and Closings At first glance, the Free Banking Era appears to be a classic example of uncontrolled inherent instability. The few regulations in free banking laws tried to protect holders of these banks' major liabilities, bank notes, from virtually any loss. Nevertheless, free bank noteholders did suffer losses and many free banks went out of business.
Laws and Operations
Before 1837, all new U.S. banks had to be chartered by a state legislature. Although these charters differed from bank to bank and from state to state, generally they established reserve and capital requirements for a bank and limited the types of loans it could make. In practice, the chartering system was a cumbersome and very political process that severely limited the number of banks opened.
Starting in 1837, many states passed general banking laws that eliminated the legislative charter requirement for a bank to be established. The new laws essentially allowed anyone to open a bank that could issue its own 1A real shock is local if it only affects a particular geographic area or a particular class of assets. An economy-wide, or global, shock affects the entire country or large classes of assets. 2An explicit model of inherent instability in banking that incorporates these ideas is Diamond and Dybvig's (1983).
3This is the aspect of bank panics that seems to motivate Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) emphasis on the high percentage of liabilities that many failed banks ultimately paid off after the Great Depression. currency (bank notes), take deposits, and make loans. The Free Banking Era derives its name from this free entry provision of the general banking laws. By 1860, a majority of the 33 states in the Union had passed such laws.
Despite its name, though, the Free Banking Era was not a period of laissez-faire banking. While entry was unrestricted, banks established under the free banking laws were subject to other restrictions. Most of the free banking laws were patterned on that passed by the New York legislature in 1838 (and amended in 1840). In particular, they contained its three regulations intended to insure the safety of free bank notes:
• Free banks had to deposit designated state bonds with the state banking authority (state auditor or treasurer) as security for all notes issued. Most states allowed bonds of other states as well as their own; some states also allowed federal bonds.
• Free banks had to pay specie (gold or silver) for notes on demand. Failure to redeem even one note meant that the state banking authority would close the bank and sell all of the assets deposited with it to pay off noteholders. Further, in many states, noteholders had preference over other bank creditors in terms of legal claims on the remaining assets of the bank.
•In general, free bank stockholders were liable for bank losses in an amount up to the value of their stock even though free banks were limited liability companies. This double liability provision meant that, if a bank failed, someone with, say, $25,000 of free bank stock not only might lose this investment, but also would be liable for an additional $25,000 of personal wealth to cover bank losses (including those on notes).
As an illustration of how a free bank operated under these laws, consider a potential banker with $50,000 of capital. To establish a free bank, that person would buy state bonds with this capital and deposit them with, say, the state auditor. In exchange, the person would receive $50,000 of notes that the new bank could issue. Presumably, these notes would get into circulation by being exchanged for other assets (loans, specie, or more state bonds, for example).
The balance sheet of the prototypical free bank would look something like Table 1 . This table assumes the free banker exchanged the initial $50,000 of notes for $25,000 more of state bonds and $25,000 of loans. These additional $25,000 of bonds were then deposited with the auditor for another $25,000 of notes which were finally exchanged for another $15,000 of loans and $10,000 of specie. Table 1 illustrates that free bank notes could be risky. Here, if the value of the bank's state bonds and loans fell below $15,000, then the value of the bank's assets plus the $50,000 additional liability of stockholders (due to the double liability provision) would be insufficient to pay off noteholders. Thus, although the free banking laws were intended to promote note safety, they were not sufficient to guarantee it.
Problems
In a previous study (Rolnick and Weber 1983) we presented evidence on the free banking experience of four states for which detailed state auditor data are available: New York, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Our findings indicated that free banking in these states did have problems, though they were quantitatively smaller than is usually suggested. Two of our major findings:
• Some free bank noteholders suffered losses. The nature of free bank notes and the fact that free banks failed imply that such losses of confidence could have occurred during the Free Banking Era. A local shock could have caused the value of the assets backing the notes of some free banks to decline, leading holders of these notes to desire to redeem them for specie and leading some of these banks to fail. If noteholders of banks relatively unaffected by the shock were incompletely informed, they might have-rightly or wrongly-interpreted the redemptions and failures at some banks as evidence that their bank was also in trouble. In this way a local shock during this period could have caused a bank panic, that is, a large number of bank failures and closings that were not warranted by the local shock.
To determine whether the Free Banking Era had such bank panics, we first identify periods during these 26 years when local shocks caused free bank failures in the four sample states we have studied before: New York, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota (Rolnick and Weber 1984). Then we try to determine whether these failures were contagious by examining the extent to which they spread.
The obvious first pass at identifying periods when shocks affected free banks is to find periods when several banks failed. Our findings are displayed in Table 2 . Notice that most (76 of the 96) free bank failures occurred during periods of falling asset prices, as measured by large declines in the prices of either Indiana or Missouri state bonds. We would expect declines in the prices of these bonds to be potential causes of failures in at least three of our sample states because Indiana 5s made up a large portion of the bonds backing the notes of the banks that failed in New York and Indiana and Missouri 6s made up a large portion of the bonds backing the notes of the banks that failed in Wisconsin. The remaining 20 failures grouped at the bottom of the table occurred during periods of steady or rising bond prices. This focus on an interstate test of contagion during the Free Banking Era can be justified by the concern about a general loss of confidence in the banking system. But a skeptic might argue that more geographically limited bank runs-say, of an intrastate nature-could also indicate such a loss. That is, while the Free Banking Era may not have had bank panics that crossed state boundaries, it could have had panics within states.
Therefore, we perform a second test, looking for evidence of intrastate contagion. Although we cannot determine explicitly whether bank failures spread through unwarranted bank runs in our sample states, we can establish that within a state the banks that failed or closed after local shocks had portfolios much more vulnerable to the shocks than the banks that remained in business. This suggests that even intrastate contagion was limited.
Minnesota's experience is a good example. The banks that failed in this state in the summer of 185 9 backed their notes almost exclusively with Minnesota 7s, the ill-fated railroad bonds. Those banks that stayed in business had bonds that held their value, either Minnesota 8s (backed by explicit taxes) or Ohio 6s. Tables 3 and 4 The Relationship Between State Bonds Backing Notes and Bank Status After Local Shocks in the Free Banking Era Wisconsin had a similar experience. The Wisconsin banks that went out of business between June 1860 and June 1861 had a far higher percentage of Southern bonds backing their notes than those that stayed in business. In Table 3 
Summary and Implications
If banking is inherently unstable, then the riskiness of free bank notes could have led to bank panics during the Free Banking Era. Yet we found no evidence that bank failures in one state spread to other states or even spread within a state during this period. A plausible explanation for the lack of contagion is that the state bonds deposited with the state banking authorities as backing for free bank notes became public information. This, of course, does not mean that free bank failures never made the public question some banks. Since noteholders were aware of which bonds backed their notes, however, they were at least not likely to lose confidence in sound banks once a bank or even a group of banks failed.
6 That is, we have found that the public 5 The data on bond holdings for both Wisconsin and New York are taken from the last balance sheet available before the period of the local shock. Since the date of this balance sheet precedes the local shock period, the numbers of total banks and bank failures and closings do not agree with those given in Table 2 or earlier in the text. 6 Some might be willing to accept the interpretation that the state bond reserve requirement prevented bank failures from spreading, but would argue that this regulation had the undesirable side effect of increasing the number of free bank failures. They would argue that this regulation, by requiring banks to back their note issue with risky state bonds, led free banks to hold riskier portfolios than they generally did not lose confidence in banking during the Free Banking Era because they were relatively well informed about the quality of the backing of their notes.
This study of one period of U.S. banking history suggests that regulations which provide information to the public about the quality of the backing of bank liabilities can effectively control inherent instability. 7 The obvious implication for today is that regulations intended to control banking instability should provide depositors with better information on the quality of the backing of their bank deposits. Two examples of regulatory changes which would do that are more complete disclosure of individual bank portfolios and higher reserve ratios on bank liabilities. This study must be interpreted cautiously, however. Nothing in it suggests that in a totally unregulated environment information on the quality of bank portfolios would not be made available to the public either by banks themselves or by some bank rating service (such as the bank note reporters that were regularly published during the Free Banking Era). Our study provides no evidence, that is, on the deeper question of whether or not banking is inherently unstable.
